Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to model and study the effectiveness of an attack on the anonymity of Internet users by a group of collaborating eavesdroppers. Design/methodology/approach -The paper is based on an analysis of the Internet topology. The study is based on two methods for choosing nodes that contribute the most to the detection of as many communicating Internet users as possible. Findings -The paper illustrates that it is possible to compromise the anonymity of many Internet users when eavesdropping on a relatively small number of nodes, even when the most central ones are protected from eavesdropping. Research limitations/implications -It is assumed that the Internet users under attack are not using any anonymity enhancing technologies, but nodes can be protected from eavesdropping. It proposes a measure of the success of an attack on Internet users' anonymity, for a given deployment of collaborating eavesdroppers in the Internet. Practical implications -The paper shows that several, and not necessarily the most prominent, collaborating nodes can compromise the anonymity of a considerable portion of Internet users. This study also emphasizes that when trying to completely compromise the anonymity of Internet users, an eavesdroppers' deployment strategy that considers eavesdroppers' collaboration can result in substantial resource saving compared to choosing a set of the most prominent nodes. Originality/value -The paper proposes a new measure of anonymity level in the network, based on the linkability of the Internet users. This paper is the first to present results of a non-trivial Group Betweenness optimization strategy in large complex networks.
Introduction
Throughout the world, millions of people are using the Internet at any given moment. Each of these users has his/her own agenda, whether seeking information,
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www. emeraldinsight.com/1066-2243.htm system. An intruder or dishonest employee directly involved with traffic management inside an autonomous system is able to launch an attack on anonymity by linking between communicating parties whose traffic is routed through this autonomous system. Faloutsos et al. (1999) , Strogatz (2001) , and Vazquez et al. (2002) have shown the Internet to be a scale-free network. Barabási and Albert (1999) characterized such networks by a power-law distribution of connectivity degree, meaning that the probability of a node to have k connections to other nodes is proportional to k a . Plots of functions of this form have a long right tail which continues to be non-zero even for very high values of k. Practically, this implies that there are a few very central nodes (with a lot of connections), while most of the network nodes are peripheral. Scale-free networks allow substantial information coverage by eavesdropping on a fairly small number of central nodes (Barthélemy, 2004) . Therefore, to preserve the users' privacy, these nodes should be protected from eavesdropping.
Since in our case nodes are autonomous systems, there are no easy ways to protect them. Rules, internal regulations, and tight security can prevent insiders' attacks that may leak sensitive information out of the organization. Nevertheless, if the organization itself decides to eavesdrop or several organizations that own autonomous systems decide to collaborate, they all have chances to successfully launch the attack on Internet users' anonymity.
In this study we show that attackers can attain substantial information coverage even when the most prominent nodes are protected. We evaluate and compare two deployment strategies of a group of collaborating eavesdroppers. In the first strategy the attackers may choose a set of the most prominent non-protected nodes and in the second strategy the nodes are chosen taking into account the mutual effects the nodes have on each other (Puzis et al, 2007a, b) . Prominence of nodes and groups of nodes is measured by their betweenness centrality (BC) (Freeman, 1977; Everett and Borgatti, 1999) . Betweenness is roughly defined as the total fraction of shortest paths between all pairs of nodes that pass through the investigated node (or group of nodes). More extensive explanation of Betweenness is given in the Section 3.
The outline of this paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a review on anonymity in the web and on the BC measure, and its usage in complex networks. In Section 3 we quantify the success of the attack on anonymity when eavesdropping on nodes on the Internet using the BC measure. In Section 4 we quantify the success of the attack on anonymity of a group of collaborating nodes. Section 5 illustrates through simulations the possible achievements of attackers and defenders of users' anonymity. Section 6 presents the conclusions of the study.
Related work
Work related to this study includes two different fields, the first is anonymity in the web and the second field is BC measure. Presented below is a brief overview of both fields, which serves as background material for this study.
Anonymity in the web
The web is based on a client-server model. Users are clients of web sites, which are hosted on servers. Instead of using the terms user, initiator or client, all of the above will be referred to as sender, and the terms web-server, surfed-site or end-server, will be referred to as recipient. Both sender and recipient communicate using standard protocols, such as TCP/IP, which is widely used in the Internet network.
What then, is anonymity? Pfitzmann and Hansen (2008) defined anonymity as "the state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set". A sender is identifiable when one receives information that can be linked to the sender, e.g. when the IP address of the machine used by the sender can be linked to him/her. Waidner (1986, 1989) described sender and receiver anonymity as the ability to conceal sender and receiver identity from an attacker. They defined unlinkability as the ability to prevent an attacker from linking the actual message sent by the sender to the actual message received by the recipient. Gabber et al. (1997) defined the anonymity of a user as a state in which the identity of the user is kept secret; that is, a web site or a coalition of web sites cannot (except with negligible probability) determine the true identity of the user from his/her alias(es).
Attacks on sender or recipient anonymity could be committed by any entity in the path between the sender and the recipient that is capable of listening to some or all the communication flow, which includes bodies such as the local area administrator, the user's Internet service provider, the recipient him/herself, who might wish to reveal the sender's identity and interests, or the sender, who might "learn" about information stored on the recipient's computer. An attack can also be committed by collaborations, consisting of some senders, receivers, and other parties, or variations of these. Rubin (1998, 1999) considered the anonymity properties available to an individual user against four distinct types of attackers:
( An attacker may use various kinds of attacks in order to expose the sender and the recipient such as those described by Berthold et al. (2000) , Raymond (2001) , or Song and Korba (2002) . Some of the attacks are categorized as "general traffic analysis attacks". Traffic analysis attacks pose a problem in regard to the preservation of confidentiality of conversers' identities and of the conversation's timing (Shields and Levine, 2000) .
In an attempt to provide some technical solutions to fill the apparent privacy void for computer network information exchange, several network-based privacy-enhancing technologies that provide varying levels of private Attack on Internet users' anonymity communication between parties have been developed in recent years (Elovici and Glezer, 2003; Reiter and Rubin, 1998; Gritzalis, 2004; Claessens et al., 1999; Chaum, 1981; Goldschlag et al., 1999; Freedman and Morris, 2002; Shields and Levine, 2002) . The basic concept underlying these solutions for preserving anonymity on the Internet is the hiding of identifiable tracks "leaking" from the communication infrastructure, by creating an anonymous channel between a sender and a recipient. The anonymous channel is based on dedicated servers or user agents, or a combination of both. The goal of these approaches is to protect users against traffic analysis attacks, where an adversary can match a message sender with the receiver. Some of these methods can be implemented by network service providers supplying a revocable anonymity service to Internet users . However, the methods mentioned above have not proven to be completely immune to traffic analysis attacks or require a trusted entity that will provide anonymity services. Anonymity level is usually a property of a system for anonymous communication and indicates the ability of an attacker to identify the senders and/or recipients of the communications. In order to evaluate the performance of a growing number of different anonymity services, several metrics have been proposed for quantifying the level of anonymity. Most of these metrics are based on the size of the anonymity set (within which the sender and/or the recipient cannot be identified), on distribution of the probability that a particular user is the sender or recipient of the communication, or both. Serjantov and Danezis (2002) and Díaz et al. (2003) independently proposed a measure of anonymity based on Shanon's entropy. Edman et al. (2007) proposed a system-wide metric based on the permanence of a matrix. In this paper we define a global metric for unlinkability of Internet users given a set of collaborating eavesdroppers.
In this study, we assume that the Internet users are not using any privacy-enhancing technologies and that their communication is exposed. However, authorities may assist users to maintain their privacy by tightening the security of the most prominent nodes in the network and preventing leakage of sensitive information from the responsible organization. Collaborating eavesdroppers resemble distributed collaborative intrusion detection systems that sample traffic in order to detect the outbreak of Internet worms in their early stages (Yegneswaran et al., 2004; Cai et al., 2005; Shmatikov and Wang, 2007) . Despite the apparent differences in the target and architecture of collaborative intrusion detection and collaborating eavesdroppers discussed in this paper, there are many similarities in methods that can be utilized by both. Elements of both systems must share information gathered during their operation in order to increase effectiveness of the whole system. Both systems utilize mainly passive monitoring. The primary characteristic of this technique is that it has no effect on the traffic being monitored. Passive monitoring can only be detected by launching a probe-response attack (Bethencourt et al., 2005) on the monitoring system. When elements of intrusion detection systems are "probed" by intentionally suspicious traffic they generate an alert that can be detected by a third party and thus reveal the location of these elements. Similarly, a communication that is seemingly of interest to the eavesdroppers can be routed through some nodes of the network. If the eavesdroppers act after seeing this communication it means that these nodes are under surveillance. Unfortunately, the actions of eavesdroppers are not as well-defined as the operation of intrusion detection systems and may not be seen by the third party trying to detect their activities. Nevertheless, if eavesdropped nodes are detected, sophisticated Internet users may route their communications to avoid the eavesdropped nodes and so preserve their privacy.
Naïve Internet users may assume that since the Internet network is so large, their communication tracks will blend into the communication tracks of others. In the rest of the paper, we show that such an assumption is quite misleading even in the presence of above-mentioned governmental protection. If several eavesdroppers collaborate in order to compromise Internet users' anonymity and choose the nodes to be monitored in an optimal manner, there is a significant chance that they can track down the communications of many individual users.
Complex topologies and BC measure
A variety of studies aimed at comprehending the generic features of complex network development have shown that many systems display topologies that often seem random and unpredictable. Two examples of complex networks are in the social sciences, and the Internet. In the social sciences nodes are persons or organizations while the edges characterize the relations between them (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) . In the Internet, nodes are routers/autonomous-systems and edges are the links connecting one router/autonomous-system to another.
Surprisingly, research has shown that complex networks self-organize into a scale-free structure and that their node connectivity distribution follows a power-law (Barabási and Albert, 1999; Barabási et al., 2000) . Therefore, independent of the nature of the system and the identity of its constituents, the probability P(k) that a node in the network is connected to k other nodes decays as a power-law, following PðkÞ , k 2g . The Internet, for example, is a growing network interconnecting millions of computers around the world. It has been shown that despite the Internet's apparent random character, its topology has a universal scale-free characteristic that is determined by the web's connectivity (Barabási et al., 2000; Vazquez et al., 2002) . This characteristic is found to be a consequence of two generic mechanisms: the continuous expansion of networks due to additions of new nodes and the preferential attachment of new nodes to already well-connected nodes (Barabási and Albert, 1999) .
In order to analyze and understand the roles played by nodes in complex networks, many network-analytic studies in recent years have relied on the evaluation of centrality measures defined for the nodes of the network. These measures have been used to rank the individual node's prominence according to its position in the network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994 ).
An important centrality measure that we will be focusing on in the current study is the shortest path BC defined by Freeman (1977) . BC measures the extent to which a node lies on the paths between other nodes. The BC of a node is defined as the sum of fractions of shortest paths between pairs of nodes in a network in which the node takes part. High BC scores indicate a high ratio of shortest paths that a node lies on. Various modifications of the original BC measure were summarized by Brandes (2008) , along with efficient algorithms for their computation.
BC was designed as a measure of the extent to which a node has control over information flow in communication networks. It is even used by Yan et al. (2006) to Attack on Internet users' anonymity administer a routing scheme that avoids potential congestions. BC can also be used by an eavesdropper seeking to launch an attack on anonymity on the Internet. The purpose of this attack on anonymity is to unveil the identity of communicating nodes. The identity of the communicating nodes can be traced by eavesdropping on one node on the path along which the information flows between two of them. By applying the centrality measure, an eavesdropper can measure how much information will pass through each node in the network, and eavesdrop on nodes that are more likely to contribute to his/her objective. The more pairs of nodes that communicate through an eavesdropped node, the greater the probability the attack on anonymity will succeed. Furthermore, by strategically choosing a group of collaborating nodes to eavesdrop on, an eavesdropper may gain more control over information flow. An eavesdropper cannot rely on the centrality measure of a singe node while trying to calculate the effectiveness of a group of collaborating nodes. This is due to the redundant contribution certain nodes may have while collaborating with other nodes, for example by covering the same communication paths. Instead, the attacker can try to maximize the number of distinct communication paths covered by the group.
Locating eavesdroppers on nodes with high centrality
Next we formalize the methods that can be exploited by attackers to locate eavesdroppers on key positions in the Internet topology. Although the terminology used in this section is fairly intuitive, the reader is suggested to look into West (2001) and Brandes (2008) for an introduction into graph theory and BC. Let us assume an eavesdropper is seeking to launch an attack on the anonymity of Internet users. Let G ¼ ðV ; EÞ describe the Internet network, where v [ V represent the nodes in the network, and e [ E represent the links between the nodes. Let n describe the number of nodes and m describe the number of links. We further assume that all graphs presented in our study are undirected, connected and un-weighted.
The eavesdropper's objective is to unveil the identity of communicating parties. The eavesdropper may achieve his objective by eavesdropping on nodes that lie on as many communication paths as possible. At this preliminary stage, we assume that our eavesdropper has the resources to eavesdrop on one single node. This assumption requires the eavesdropper to carefully choose the node through which most information flows. By applying the BC measure, an eavesdropper can estimate how much information will pass through each node in the network and locate nodes that are more likely to contribute to its objective.
Standard measures of BC can be used to measure a node's importance in a graph. High BC scores indicate that a node lies on many fractions of shortest paths connecting others (Freeman, 1977) , therefore eavesdropping such nodes increases the success rate of an attack on anonymity. The shortest path from node s to node t is the path we get by moving from s to its predecessors, and then to the predecessors of each successive node, until t is reached. If a node has two or more predecessors, then there may be more than one shortest path between s and t, which may or may not share some nodes. Let s st denote the number of shortest paths from node s to node t. Let s st ðvÞ denote the number of shortest paths from node s to node t on which some node v lies. For example, in the network given in Figure 1 , it can be seen that there are four shortest paths between node 1 and node 10: {1-2-3-5-8-10}, {1-2-3-6-8-10}, {1-2-3-6-9-10} and {1-2-4-7-9-10}. Therefore, given s ¼ 1 and t ¼ 10, s st ¼ 4. Furthermore, given v ¼ 6, s st ð6Þ ¼ 2, since there are only two shortest paths from s to t on which v lies.
Brandes (2001) 
Let C B ðvÞ denote the BC for node v:
Algebraic path counting can be used to compute BC of all vertices in the graph in Oðn 3 Þ. Brandes (2001) suggested a more efficient algorithm that eliminates the need for summation of all pair-dependencies. While iterating over all source vertices in the graph it calculates the dependency of the source on all other nodes. At the end of the iteration, the dependency calculated for each node is added to the BC score of that node.
Assume every pair of nodes generates the same communication flow in the network. Let S(v) denote the percentage of communicating pairs of nodes an eavesdropper can monitor at v. S(v) can be calculated by dividing the C B ðvÞ by the total number of communicating pairs C 2 n where n is the number of nodes in the network:
Accordingly, we define the measure of global anonymity of all users in the network when the eavesdropper is monitoring a single node v (A(v)) by the following equation:
A higher BC of a node that is monitored by an eavesdropper results in lower anonymity of the users in the network. AðvÞ ¼ 0 means that eavesdroppers have the 
Group of collaborating eavesdroppers
As demonstrated in the previous section, an eavesdropper devising an attack on anonymity may enjoy a higher success rate by eavesdropping on a node with higher BC. In many scenarios, eavesdropping on a single node may not be sufficient to accomplish a successful attack on anonymity. In such a case, a collaborative attack of a group of nodes that are eavesdropped may prove to be more efficient. The intuitive way to use the BC measure while devising a collaborative attack would be to sort the nodes by their BC values and eavesdrop on a group of nodes with the highest BC values. This basic intuitive approach is not free of doubts. The contribution of a node's BC to a group cannot be added linearly. This limitation stems from the nature of the BC value, which does not take into account the role of other nodes in the group. For example, a pair of attackers may be positioned on two neighboring nodes, each having a very high BC value. Nonetheless, these two nodes may be located on the same shortest paths so that neither of the attackers contributes novel information to the other. In order to define the success of eavesdropping on a group of nodes we use group betweenness centrality (GBC), as defined by Everett and Borgatti (1999) . GBC of a group of nodes stands for the fraction of shortest paths between pairs of nodes in a network that passes through at least one of the nodes in the group. Thus, GBC can be used for estimating the ability of a group of collaborating nodes to monitor the network traffic.
GBC can be viewed from an additional utilitarian point of view. While integrating the group centrality calculations as part of a comprehensive strategy, an eavesdropper can exploit the GBC measure in order to minimize the overall costs, while acquiring sufficient malicious nodes across the network. The basic assumption underlying this conclusion is that an attacker seeks to gain as much information as possible with minimum effort or cost. For example, an eavesdropper seeking to launch an attack on anonymity on the Internet may gather as much information as possible in order to obtain the identity of communicating individuals. Obtaining such information is possible by eavesdropping on nodes located on the communication paths of as many communicating pairs as possible. The GBC measure is suggested for the purpose of addressing this need.
We have modified the algorithm for computing the BC of all vertices (Brandes, 2001 ) to compute the GBC of one group of nodes in the same asymptotic running time (Yagil, 2005 ) (see the Appendix for explanations of the algorithm along with complete pseudo-code).
Algorithm 1: Computing the GBC of a group Input. The graph G ¼ ðV ; EÞ and the group ðv1; . . . ; vkÞ # V .
Output. GBC (initialized to zero).
Calculation
(1) Loop through all nodes s [ V :
. Let S be an empty stack that will be used to sort nodes in the order of non-increasing distance form s.
. Let P s,w be a list of predecessors of w on the way from s.
.
Let d s,t be the distance between nodes s and t. d s,t is initalized to 2 1 for each s and t except d s,s which is equal to zero.
. Let s s,t be the number of shortest paths between s and t. s s,t is initalized to zero except s s,t which is equal to 1.
. Let Q be a queue iniitaly containing only s. Q will be used to traverse G in breadth first order. (2) While Q is not empty: Brandes (2008) . A different algorithm that efficiently computes the GBC of many groups on the same network was proposed by Puzis et al. (2007b) .
Let Sðv 1 ; . . . ; v k Þ denote the success of an eavesdropper in intercepting communications between nodes, while monitoring all the communication of nodesv 1 ; ::; v k . Sðv 1 ; . . . ; v k Þ can be calculated by dividing the GBCðv 1 ; . . . ; v k Þ by the total number of communicating pairsC 2 n , where n is the number of nodes in the network. The greater the GBC of a group of nodes is, the greater the success of the eavesdropper located on these nodes:
Accordingly, the measure of global anonymity of all the users in the network, when the eavesdropper is monitoring nodes v 1 ; ::; v k (denoted byAðv 1 ; . . . ; v k Þ), may be defined by the following equation:
Higher GBC values of a group of nodes that are monitored by an eavesdropper signify lower anonymity levels of the users of the network. It is reasonable to assume that the effort required to eavesdrop a group of nodes (Fðv 1 ; . . . ; v k Þ) is proportional to the total amount of analyzed traffic. BC is highly correlated with the amount of traffic passing through a node in communication networks (Holme, 2003; Yan et al., 2006) . Therefore, we use the sum of the BC of the group members as a measure of the attackers' effort:
5. Evaluating an attack on anonymity on the Internet In this section we evaluate the ease or difficulty of compromising the anonymity of Internet users by a group of collaborating eavesdroppers when the most central nodes are protected. In order to perform the evaluations, we used a snapshot of the Internet autonomous systems level topology from March 24, 2008 made available by CAIDA. We executed the simulations on an un-weighted undirected version of the network. The network contained 21,823 nodes and 89,866 links, with an average degree of 4.11 and power-law exponent of degree distribution of -1.12. Only 2250 (, 1 percent) of the nodes in the network have degrees above the average. Due to the scale-free structure of the investigated network a few most central nodes cover almost all the Internet traffic. We assumed that the attackers were eavesdropping on 1 to 100 nodes from the 5000 (, 23 percent) most central nodes in the network, while 1 to 18 of the most central nodes were protected from eavesdropping. We have tested two attacker deployment strategies. In the first strategy (TopK) the attackers chose the nodes with highest BC (K nodes with the highest). In the second strategy (GreedyKGBC) the attackers constructed the group of nodes iteratively by choosing each time a node with greatest contribution to the GBC of the already chosen nodes (Puzis et al., 2007a) . The simulation results are presented in Figures 2-4 . The anonymity level as the function of the size of the group of attackers is presented in Figure 2 . The deployment strategy here was GreedyKGBC, as it produced results better than or equal to TopK in all simulations. The different series in Figure 2 correspond to the number of protected nodes. For example, if the ten most central nodes are protected from eavesdropping it is enough to eavesdrop on 48 less central nodes to reduce the anonymity level to 0.4 (see Figure 2 left ). In this paper we derive the anonymity level from the GBC value of the group of eavesdropped nodes and the effort required to eavesdrop on the group of nodes from the sum of BC values of the respective nodes. The relationship between the anonymity level and the eavesdropping effort of groups found by TopK and GreedyKGBC strategies are shown in Figure 2 (right). In simulations summarized in this figure, nodes were not protected from eavesdropping. We can see that when there are few collaborating nodes the attackers gain roughly what they are paying for. However, when network coverage increases, the effort required to increase it even more is enormously high compared to the potential gain. The reason is redundant inspection of the same traffic by many nodes in the network. We can also see that when network coverage increases, the difference between two deployment strategies becomes apparent. This is more pronounced in Figure 4 .
We can see in Figure 3 (left), that when some of the most central nodes are protected the attacker needs to eavesdrop more nodes in order to compromise anonymity in the Attack on Internet users' anonymity network with the same level of success. However, bandwidth requirements remain roughly the same as can be noticed from Figure 3 (right). We can also see in Figure 3 (left) that when the attackers' target is to reduce the anonymity level to 0.7 the number of eavesdropped nodes is roughly equal to the number of protected nodes. Moreover, protected nodes have a higher individual BC than the eavesdropped nodes. If we assume that the attackers' eavesdropping effort is equal to the effort required to protect the nodes from eavesdropping, then Figure 3 (right) suggests that such protection is highly inefficient.
Finally we would like to compare the two strategies for deployment of collaborating eavesdroppers. We can see in Figure 4 that when the attacker wants to compromise the anonymity of most of the Internet users (anonymity level lower than 0.05), it is better to use GreedyKGBC to locate the optimal group despite the required computational effort. For example, in order to reduce the anonymity level to 0.01 the attackers may eavesdrop on 54 nodes instead of the 73 nodes suggested by the TopK strategy, reducing the number of eavesdropped nodes by approximately 25 percent (see Figure 4 left). Similarly, GreedyKGBC reduces the eavesdropping effort by 8.9 percent compared to TopKBC (see Figure 4 right). Our simulations show that the difference between the two strategies decreases as more most-central-nodes are protected.
Conclusion and future work
In this study we analyzed an attack by a group of eavesdroppers who collaborate to compromise the Internet users' anonymity by eavesdropping on several nodes on the Internet. We assumed that the Internet users under attack are not using any anonymity enhancing technologies and that the most prominent nodes may be protected from eavesdropping. Possible future research not covered by this paper includes analysis of the global anonymity level in the case where the most prominent nodes are not only protected from eavesdropping but also supply anonymity services. Future research may also include a more precise cost model or investigating anonymity of Internet communities in the presence of global eavesdroppers. We have demonstrated how GBC can be used to evaluate the level of anonymity, given a group of collaborating eavesdroppers on the Internet. We illustrated that it is possible to compromise the anonymity of many Internet users when eavesdropping on a relatively small number of nodes. We also show that these nodes are not necessarily the most prominent nodes. Our study demonstrates the ease of a significant attack on anonymity even when the most prominent nodes in the network cannot be eavesdropped. According to assumptions and findings of this work it is not cost efficient to prevent autonomous systems from being eavesdropped. A good alternative would be regulations that will prevent eavesdropped autonomous systems from collaborating with one another.
This study also emphasizes that when trying to completely compromise the anonymity of Internet users, an eavesdropper's deployment method based on GBC can result in substantial resource saving compared to choosing a set of the most prominent nodes.
To summarize, this study complements previous studies in the field of Internet topology and adds to our understanding of interactions between nodes within a network.
